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JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION POST-
BOOKER: ARE JUDGES GETTING A DISTORTED 
VIEW THROUGH THE LENS OF SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES? 
Christina R. Weatherford∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Jessica Binkerd, a graduate of the University of California, Santa 
Barbara,1 probably never imagined that pictures taken from her 
MySpace website would one day help send her to jail. Regrettably, 
that is exactly what happened. On August 6, 2006, Binkerd was 
driving her co-worker, twenty-five-year-old Alex Baer, home from a 
party when she swerved into oncoming traffic and collided with 
another car.2 Unfortunately, Baer did not survive the accident.3 
Binkerd’s blood alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit.4 
Binkerd was subsequently charged and convicted of vehicular 
manslaughter without gross negligence and driving under the 
influence of alcohol causing injury.5 In 2007, a Santa Barbara 
superior court judge disregarded the probation department’s 
recommendation of less than a one year jail sentence,6 opting instead 
to impose a much harsher penalty of five years and four months in 
state prison.7 Despite pleas for leniency from the victim’s family,8 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Caren 
Morrison and the Law Review editors for their valuable insight and suggestions. 
 1. Steve Chawkins, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2007, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/22/local/me-mercy22 [hereinafter 
Chawkings, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. People v. Binkerd, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1143, 1146, 1146 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 5. Id. at 1146. Binkerd was also charged with driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent 
or higher causing injury, but the charge was dismissed. Id. at 1146–47.  
 6. Id. at 1150. 
 7. Id. at 1147 (overruling sentence on unrelated grounds). Binkerd was ultimately sentenced to 
three years in jail after a California Court of Appeals judge overturned the original sentence and 
remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 1150–51; Chris Meagher, Drunk Driver Sentenced to Three 
Years, SANTA BARBARA INDEP., May 13, 2008, http://www.independent.com/news/2008/may/13/drunk-
driver-sentenced-three-years/. 
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Judge Lodge ultimately decided that pictures posted on MySpace of 
Binkerd wearing an “I heart Patr–n” t-shirt and drinking with friends 
after the fatal accident9 indicated a lack of remorse that warranted a 
tougher sentence.10  
Binkerd is not alone. In the last few years, several similar cases 
have resulted in longer sentences partially due to information taken 
from social networking sites being presented at the sentencing 
hearing.11 
In a world where Facebook and MySpace are among the top five 
most popular websites12 and twenty-one million people are 
“tweeting”13 in the United States alone,14 one can see how the 
plethora of information available online and the ease with which it 
can be accessed will have a significant impact on the criminal justice 
system. Many courts already grapple with how to deal with the 
Internet. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has gone so far 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Steve Chawkins, Judge Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Plea for Mercy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at B1, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jan/27/local/me-mercy27 [hereinafter Chawkins, Judge 
Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Pleas for Mercy]. 
 9. Sonia Lucyga, Pictures Affect Sentencing in UCSB Student DUI Case, DAILY NEXUS (Santa 
Barbara, CA), Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.dailynexus.com/2007-02-01/pictures-affect-
sentencing-in-ucsb-student-dui-case/.  
 10. Chawkins, Judge Snubs Victim’s Kin’s Plea for Mercy, supra note 8. 
 11. See, e.g., Melissa Evans, Internet Plays Key Role in Vehicular Manslaughter Sentence, SANTA 
BARBARA NEWSROOM, Apr. 14, 2007, available at http://www.santabarbaranewsroom.com/news/crime-
-justice/internet-plays-key-role-in-vehicular-manslaughter-sentence.html (showing pictures of defendant 
holding a glass of wine and drinking related comments defendant posted on MySpace used by District 
Attorney); Eric Tucker, Web Photos Work Against Defendants, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2008, at 4 
(describing how a prosecutor presented pictures from Facebook of defendant dressed in an inmate 
costume at a Halloween party two weeks after a crash that seriously injured a woman). 
 12. Daniel E. Harmon, Five Months of “Faces”: Notes on Social Networking’s Advantages & Risks, 
26 No. 24 LAWYER’S PC 1 (2009) (noting Facebook ranked third and MySpace ranked fifth on Alexa: 
The Web Information Company’s “Top Sites,” which ranks the 100 most popular websites in the United 
States); see also Leah DaSilva, Note, The Next Generation of Sexual Conduct: Expanding The 
Protective Reach of Rape Shield Laws to Include Evidence Found on MySpace, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & 
APP. ADVOC. 211, 214 (2008) (noting that MySpace has consistently ranked in the top ten most heavily 
visited websites in the United States since 2007); Peter T. Wakiyama & Odia Kagan, Facebook Vanity 
URLs May Hurt More Than Just One’s Pride, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. No. 9, 7 (2009) (noting 
that since its founding in early 2004, Facebook has gained more than 200 million registered users). 
 13. See James Cool & Thomas Young, Do Well By Doing Good, 45 TRIAL 32, 36 (Aug. 2009) 
(“Twitter is a ‘microblogging’ site that allows you to tell members of your network what you are doing 
or thinking with 140-character status updates called ‘tweets.’”). 
 14. Nielsenwire, Social Media Stats: Myspace Music Growing, Twitter’s Big Move, July 17, 2009, 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/social-media-stats-myspace-music-growing-twitters-
big-move/. 
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as banning jurors from using all electronic communications during 
trial.15 Presumably, this move is in reaction to recent cases of jurors 
posting information about an ongoing trial online16 and going online 
to research aspects of the trial.17  
Social networking sites have also affected criminal procedure. For 
example, scholars have begun to argue that rape shield laws should 
be expanded to include online behavior in the definition of sexual 
conduct.18 Although courts have started to confront problems facing 
the criminal justice system in the age of the Internet, one area where 
these pitfalls have not been addressed is in sentencing. 
Judicial sentencing discretion has evolved from a policy of almost 
unlimited discretion, to the application of mandatory guidelines with 
little judicial discretion allowed, and recently back to, in many ways, 
unlimited discretion.19 This Note addresses the evolution and current 
state of judicial sentencing discretion in the United States and 
discusses the potential impact the information now available through 
social networking sites may have on the sentencing system. Part I 
examines the history of the United States sentencing system. This 
discussion focuses on the historical backdrop of United States v. 
Booker, a 2005 Supreme Court decision holding the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory, not mandatory.20 Part II 
discusses the rise of the Internet and social networking sites. Part III 
examines how the world of social networking sites affects sentencing 
determinations. Particular interest is given to the potential for judges 
                                                                                                                 
 15. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)–(d) (amended June 30, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009) (indicating 
that judges must instruct jurors that they may not “use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic 
device with communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during deliberation” or “to obtain 
or disclose information about the case when they are not in court”). 
 16. See United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *57–67 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) 
(making a motion for new trial based on juror’s postings on Twitter and Facebook during trial); United 
States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (noting a second motion for new trial based on 
jurors exposure to media reports regarding use of social networking sites during the trial). 
 17. See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html 
(mistrial declared in Federal case after nine jurors admitted to doing independent online research 
regarding a complicated prescription drug case). 
 18. See generally DaSilva, supra note 12. 
 19. See discussion infra Part I. 
 20. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J.). 
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to obtain a distorted view of defendants from their online profiles and 
what impact this may have on sentencing determinations. Part IV 
proposes potential ways courts can prevent this distorted view from 
inappropriately impacting sentencing determinations, including 
imposing new limits on what evidence judges may use to make their 
sentencing determinations. However, this Note also recognizes the 
current trend in Supreme Court decisions moving towards a pre-
Guidelines approach of unlimited judicial discretion and recognizes 
that because of the current climate of the Supreme Court, limits on 
judicial discretion are unlikely. Thus, this Note ultimately suggests 
that unless the Supreme Court changes its view on judicial sentencing 
discretion and allows limitations on the use of information from 
social networking sites, the potential for a distorted view of 
defendants may have to be an accepted risk of the sentencing system. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The determination of an appropriate sentence is a difficult issue for 
judges.21 And, it is a responsibility that falls squarely to the judge 
alone.22 The amount of sentencing discretion allotted to judges has 
varied throughout history. Traditionally, judges were granted almost 
unlimited discretion subject only to the bounds of the Constitution 
and criminal statutes.23 The implementation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines restrained judicial sentencing discretion by 
imposing mandatory sentence ranges applied mechanically based on 
                                                                                                                 
 21. United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 866 (1979). 
 22. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 526 at 88–
89 (3d ed. 1998). 
 23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); Dorszynski v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974) (discussing the “unfettered sentencing discretion” given to trial 
judges); see also U.S. CONST. amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); William W. Berry III, Discretion Without 
Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 
635 (2008) (“Throughout the first two hundred years of the United States, Congress typically provided 
statutory maximums or sentencing ranges for federal crimes and left federal judges broad discretion to 
consider any aggravating or mitigating factor they deemed relevant.”). 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/5
2011] JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION POST-BOOKER  
 
677
specified factors.24 Recently, the policy of broad judicial discretion 
has reemerged.25 
A.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1949, the United States Supreme Court stated that a sentencing 
judge is permitted to “exercise a wide discretion in the sources and 
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and 
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.”26 
Under this system of indeterminate sentencing, uniformity and 
predictability were lacking due to the variation of sentences imposed 
for similarly situated offenders.27 This view of unregulated discretion 
continued largely unchecked until the mid-1980s.28  
It was not until Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 establishing the United States Sentencing Commission29 that a 
significant move was made to restrict the largely unfettered discretion 
allotted to sentencing judges.30 The Commission promulgated the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, which drastically narrowed 
judicial discretion by mandating a sentence range based on the 
seriousness of the defendant’s offense and his past criminal history.31 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 2009); see also discussion infra 
Part I.A. 
 25. See discussion infra Part I.B–C. 
 26. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). 
 27. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“[T]he Guidelines provide uniformity, 
predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.”); Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (“[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity” so 
criminals “can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of 
action or another.”). 
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (noting that federal judges have “wide discretion in determining what 
sentence to impose” and “may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either 
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come”). 
 29. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017–18 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006)). 
 30. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974) (discussing “unfettered” judicial 
discretion); see generally Robert J. Anello & Jodi M. Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The 
Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 9 (2005) (describing the progression of federal 
sentencing). 
 31. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009) (instructions for determining 
sentence range). 
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Under the Guidelines, a judge must first consult the sentencing grid 
to determine the “base offense level.”32 Once the base level is 
determined, the judge may adjust the offense level upward or 
downward based on listed offense characteristics.33 Further 
adjustment is then made based on the victim, role of the defendant, 
acceptance of responsibility, criminal history, and offender 
characteristics.34 According to Congress, the Sentencing Reform Act, 
through the Guidelines, sought to remedy the two major pitfalls of 
indeterminate sentencing: unwarranted disparity and uncertainty.35 
Initial reaction to the Guidelines was not positive. In fact, in the 
three years following the passage of the Guidelines two hundred 
federal judges held them unconstitutional.36 It was not until the 
Supreme Court ruled the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional 
in 198937 that judges began consistently imposing sentences based on 
the Guidelines. In the following years judges applied the Guidelines 
with intense rigor.38 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has 
slowly begun to return judicial discretion to the sentencing system.39 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 
(1989) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38, 65 (1983)). 
 36. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2007) (citing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 196 n.12 (1998)); see also, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 
F.2d 1245, 1254, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding the statute establishing the Federal Sentencing 
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the Commission be composed of at 
least three federal judges and authorizing those judges to promulgate substantive regulations, a duty 
reserved to the legislature).  
 37. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371, 384 (finding the Sentencing Guidelines do not violate the 
nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines of the Constitution). 
 38. Gertner, supra note 36, at 524 (noting that in the eighteen years following Mistretta “[j]udges at 
all levels, trial and appellate, applied the Guidelines as if they were . . . diktats”) (citing KATE STITH & 
JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 95 (1998)). 
 39. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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B.  The Booker Decision 
1.  Decisions Leading to Booker: Apprendi and Blakely 
For approximately two decades the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
remained mandatory.40 However, in a line of cases centered on the 
constitutionality of sentencing guidelines that began in 2000 and 
culminated with the 2005 Booker decision, the Supreme Court 
ultimately decided the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, 
not mandatory.41 The reasoning that eventually led to the Booker 
decision began with the Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey.42 In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a sentence based on 
a “hate crime” enhancement that increased the sentence range from 
five to ten years to between ten and twenty years.43 The Court 
determined that the sentence enhancement violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the enhancement 
required the judge to make factual determinations instead of the 
jury.44 The Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”45 
Four years after Apprendi, the Court reaffirmed its holding in 
Blakely v. Washington.46 In Blakely, the Court invalidated part of 
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act for violating the Sixth 
Amendment.47 The trial judge imposed a sentence that was three 
years above the standard range statutorily prescribed because he 
found Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty.”48 Washington’s 
Sentencing Reform Act provided a judge could impose an 
“exceptional sentence” based on a finding of aggravating factors.49 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 41. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 42. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 43. Id. at 468–69. 
 44. Id. at 491–92. 
 45. Id. at 490. 
 46. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 47. Id. at 303–05. 
 48. Id. at 298. 
 49. Id. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.120(2), 9.94A.390 (2000)). 
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Although Blakely’s sentence was within the maximum authorized by 
the statute regulating felonies, the Court held that the “‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”50 Soon after the Blakely 
decision, courts and scholars began to question whether similar 
sentencing enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
also violated the Sixth Amendment.51 A year later the Supreme Court 
answered this question in United States v. Booker.52 
2.  The Booker Decision 
Freddie J. Booker was convicted of possession with the intent to 
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine.53 According to the 
applicable statute, the maximum sentence for the offense was life 
imprisonment,54 and the Sentencing Guidelines imposed a base level 
sentence range of 210 months to 262 months in prison.55 However, 
the judge determined Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of 
crack and was guilty of obstructing justice and was thus subject to a 
new sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment.56 The 
judge chose 360 months.57 
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court overturned Booker’s 
sentence and held that the mandatory application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.58 The 
Court relied on the Blakely and Apprendi reasoning and held that in 
order to preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
“[a]ny fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 303. 
 51. Berry, supra note 23, at 648 (citing Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 51-DEC. 
FED. LAW. 53 (2004), and Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 272–73 (2007)).  
 52. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 53. Id. at 227. 
 54. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2008)). 
 55. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1 (2003)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35 (Stevens, J.) (Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joining). 
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jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”59 The Court held the Sentencing 
Guidelines as written violated this principle because the Guidelines 
force a judge to impose a sentence within the specified range upon 
finding some additional fact without allowing the jury to weigh in.60 
However, the Court did not completely abandon the Guidelines. 
Instead, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court determined 
the appropriate remedy for the unconstitutional application of the 
Guidelines was to remove those provisions calling for mandatory 
application.61 Thus, the Court’s decision made the Guidelines 
“effectively advisory” while maintaining their overall 
constitutionality.62 
C.  Judicial Sentencing Discretion Post-Booker 
Since the Court’s decision to make the Guidelines advisory, lower 
courts have been unsure exactly how the Guidelines are to be applied 
in sentencing determinations. Attempting to follow Booker, many 
courts have implemented a three-step process that begins with a 
calculation of the appropriate sentence range according to the 
Guidelines.63 In determining the appropriate sentence range, the 
judge takes into consideration the parties’ arguments and certain 
factors enumerated in § 3553(a).64 These factors are: (1) “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant,” (2) the need to punish, deter, protect the public, 
and rehabilitate, (3) the available sentences, (4) the sentence range for 
similar crimes, (5) policy, (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 244. 
 60. Id. at 234–35 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000)). 
 61. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J.) (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joining). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Berry, supra note 23, at 650–51 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60 (Breyer, J.)); see, e.g., Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by 
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 
(2007)). 
 64. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50 (“[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever 
sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to 
determine whether they support the sentence requested by the party.”). 
9
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sentence disparities,” and (7) “the need to provide restitution.”65 
These factors are intended to inform the judge’s determination of an 
appropriate sentence while striving to maintain the overarching 
principle that a sentence be “sufficient but not greater than 
necessary.”66 Based on consideration of these factors, the judge 
determines whether a sentence within the Guidelines is appropriate.67 
Finally, the judge must identify the sentence being imposed and 
adequately explain the reasons for that sentence.68 
The problem post-Booker is that many critics, including Justice 
Scalia, see the Court’s decision as a return to indeterminate 
sentencing because removing the mandatory application of the 
Guidelines allows judges to impose their own perceptions of justice.69 
II.  THE RISE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING 
Since online social networking began to develop in the 1990s, it 
has become a “universal phenomenon.”70 Online communication has 
become vital to connecting with the outside world for today’s 
youth.71 According to a 2007 study by the National School Boards 
Association, 96% of students with access to the Internet have visited 
a social networking site.72 Additionally, a 2009 study by Pew Internet 
                                                                                                                 
 65. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2006). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Berry, supra note 23, at 651; see, e.g., United States v. Melvin, No. 06–33(FSH), 2009 WL 
3128358, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
required a sentence outside the guidelines range “in order to justly meet the criteria of § 3553(a)”). 
 68. Berry, supra note 23, at 651 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–61). 
 69. Booker, 543 U.S. at 304–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“The statute provides no order of 
priority among all those factors . . . the statute—absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1)—authorizes the 
judge to apply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public . . . .”). 
 70. DaSilva, supra note 12, at 213 (noting Classmates.com and Evite.com, launched in 1995 and 
1998 respectively, were some of the first online social networking sites); see also Alessandro Acquisti & 
Ralph Gross, Imagine Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook 1 
(2006), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-gross-facebook-privacy-PET-final.pdf 
(“[O]nline social networks are no longer niche phenomena: millions of people around the world, young 
and old, knowingly and willing use Friendster, MySpace, Match.com, LinkedIn, and [a] hundred other 
sites to communicate, find friends, dates, and jobs . . . .”).  
 71. Kevin P. Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social Networking Websites, 244 
EDUC. LAW REP. 907, 907 (2009). 
 72. Id. (citing National School Boards Association, Creating and Connecting: Research and 
Guidelines on Online Social and Educational Networking (2007), http://nsba.org/ 
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and American Life Project found 47% of online adults use social 
networking sites.73 Facebook, one of the most popular social 
networking sites, boasts more than 500 million active users who 
upload more than 30 billion pieces of content to the site each 
month.74 
A.  Defining Social Networking Sites 
Generally speaking, social networking sites are “web-based 
services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their 
list of connections and those made by others within the system.”75 
While each social networking site is unique, a common characteristic 
is the user profile.76 Member profiles generally contain personal 
information such as age, gender, interests, and hobbies.77 Profiles can 
also contain audio and visual content, including video clips and 
digital photographs.78 Once the user profile is created, the user 
“become[s] part of [a] larger online social network[] by linking 
their . . . profile[]” with other users.79 Many social networking sites 
are global in nature and have millions of users across a broad 
demographic.80  
                                                                                                                 
SecondaryMenu/TLN/CreatingandConnecting.aspzx).  
 73. Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young Adults, 
Feb. 3, 2010, http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_ 
Adults_Report_Final_with_toplines.pdf (presenting the findings of a survey conducted between Aug. 18 
and Sept. 14, 2009 of 2,253 adults age 18 and over). 
 74. Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 25, 
2010). 
 75. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 
13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1, Art. 11 (2007), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/ 
boyd.ellison.html. 
 76. Id. 
 77. RICHARD RAYSMAN & PETER BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS § 
15.06 (2009), available at 2008 WL 4520029. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Brady, supra note 71, at 908. 
 80. Raysman, supra note 77; see, e.g., Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/ 
info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 25, 2010) (“70% of Facebook users are outside the United States.”). 
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B.  The Role of Social Networking Sites in the Courtroom 
Social networking sites have impacted several aspects of the legal 
system in the United States. Of particular importance are concerns 
regarding the potential misuse of these sites. One area of concern is 
the use of information posted online to discredit claims of sexual 
assault by tainting the alleged victim’s character.81 In response to this 
fear, scholars have argued that the definition of sexual conduct under 
rape shield laws should be expanded to include online behavior.82 By 
expanding the definition in this way, evidence of an alleged rape 
victim’s online behavior becomes inadmissible.  
Another area where the impact of social networking sites can be 
seen is in courtroom procedure. There have been several recent cases 
of jurors impermissibly using social networking sites during trials 
that have resulted in some courts banning all electronic 
communications by jurors.83 In one such case, juror Eric Wuest, 
during the prominent fraud trial of the former Pennsylvania State 
Senator Vincent Fumo, posted messages regarding the trial’s 
progression on his Facebook and Twitter accounts.84 This led Fumo’s 
defense team to file a motion to halt jury deliberations and remove 
the juror.85 The judge ultimately decided not to remove Wuest based 
on his determination that the juror remained credible and had not 
influenced the other jurors.86 Fumo’s defense lawyer subsequently 
filed an additional motion for a new trial based on the other jurors’ 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See generally DaSilva, supra note 12 (arguing for the expansion of the definition of “sexual 
conduct” in rape shield laws to include content posted on social networking sites). 
 82. Id. 
 83. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)–(d) (amended June 30, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009) (indicating 
that judges must instruct jurors that they may not “use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic 
device with communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during deliberation” or “to obtain 
or disclose information about the case when they are not in court”). 
 84. United States v. Fumo, No. 06–319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *61 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) (finding 
Wuest posted a message to his Twitter account stating, “This is it . . . no looking back now!” and 
throughout the trial Wuest made several postings on his Facebook page regarding the status of the trial, 
including the statement: “Stay tuned for the big announcement on Monday everyone!” (citing Govt. 
Resp. Mot. Judg. Acquittal and for New Trial at 141, May 15, 2009)). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. at *67 (“There was no evidence presented by either party showing that [Wuest’s] extra-jury 
misconduct had a prejudicial impact on the Defendants. The [c]ourt found, and still maintains, that 
Wuest’s actions in no way affected his impartiality.”). 
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exposure to media reports of Wuest’s use of social networking sites.87 
Although both motions were ultimately dismissed,88 the case brought 
to light the potential for a juror’s use of social networking sites to 
result in a mistrial.  
In a similar case, an Arkansas building materials company 
appealed a $12.6 million verdict against them on the ground that 
during the trial a juror posted Twitter messages that showed bias.89 In 
March 2009, the fear of a mistrial based on jurors’ improper use of 
the Internet became a reality in a Florida courtroom. After eight 
weeks of trial, a federal judge declared a mistrial after he discovered 
nine jurors had done independent online research about the 
complicated pharmaceutical case.90 
III.  IMPACT OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES ON SENTENCE 
DETERMINATIONS 
Under the current sentencing system outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Booker,91 one of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C § 3553(a) is the “history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”92 Furthermore, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3577, “[n]o 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider 
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”93 It is in this 
aspect of determining an appropriate sentence that information posted 
on social networking sites comes into play. As illustrated by the case 
of Jessica Binkerd, photographs and comments from a user’s profile 
                                                                                                                 
 87. United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Renee Loth, Mistrial by Google, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2009, at A15, available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/06/mistrial_by_google/ 
(moving for a mistrial and reversal of a $12 million judgment based on a juror’s Twitter posting stating: 
“oh, and nobody buy Stoam. Its [sic] bad mojo and they’ll probably cease to Exist [sic], now that their 
wallet is 12m lighter.”). 
 90. Schwartz, supra note 17.  
 91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976). 
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can be introduced as evidence during a sentencing hearing and may 
ultimately be a deciding factor in the judge’s determination of the 
appropriate sentence.94 
Lara Buys, another twenty-two-year-old, was also sentenced to 
prison for driving under the influence of alcohol and vehicular 
manslaughter based on evidence taken from a social networking 
site.95 At the sentencing hearing, the District Attorney presented a 
picture of Buys from MySpace that showed her holding a glass of 
wine and comments from the same site, one of which read: “My 
favorite memory would have been on my birthday one year and you 
got hammered drinking Jack and ran home to throw up and ended up 
passed out, good times, good times!!”96 In an interview, the District 
Attorney explained that the Internet is a new tool that allows 
prosecutors to prove what suspects were thinking or if they were 
remorseful.97 While the Internet and social networking sites may 
seem like a promising tool to gain insight into the minds and 
characters of defendants, the question arises whether the information 
found on these sites is an accurate depiction of the defendant outside 
of the online context. 
A.  Potential for a Distorted View of Defendants Based on Online 
Profiles 
Information posted on social networking sites poses particular 
concerns that other character evidence typically used at sentencing 
hearings does not. First, people have a natural “desire to be cool” that 
influences how they decide to portray themselves online.98 The cool 
factor of social networking sites has been present from the inception 
of the online community. The founders of MySpace, Tom Anderson 
and Chris DeWolfe, for example, started the site as a place for local 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 95. Evans, supra note 11. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in 
Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 129 (David Buckingham ed., 
2008) [hereinafter Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites].  
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bands and clubs to promote themselves and connect with fans.99 They 
focused on creating an “open” website with few rules emphasizing 
users’ ability to “freely express themselves.”100 Add the human desire 
to be cool to the unrestrained environment of MySpace, and the result 
is profiles that tend to be provocative and often include vulgar 
language and references to drugs and alcohol.101  
Social networking site users often look to other users’ profiles in 
order to judge what information they should present on their own 
profile.102 Users carefully choose what they put forward in the hope 
of being accepted by their online peers.103 This often results in users 
attempting to create a profile they hope will be deemed cool by the 
online community.104 This desire is a reflection of the basic human 
desire to be accepted by one’s peers.105 The problem with the online 
setting is the potentially public nature of the information posted.106  
Social networking site users are faced with the same choice many 
teens face in everyday life: Cool or lame? Popular or unpopular?107 
Unfortunately, it seems many users do not understand the increased 
stakes of choosing to be cool online.108 The desire to be cool may 
result in an apparent contradiction between a user’s online persona 
and her true character.109 One scholar, Danah Boyd, gives an example 
of such contradiction in her book based on a two-year study of United 
States based youth engagement with MySpace.110 She received a call 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Patricia Sellers, MySpace Cowboys, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2006, at 66, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/09/04/8384727/index.htm.  
 100. DaSilva, supra note 12, at 215. 
 101. Id. at 215–16 (citing David Narkiewicz, The Dangers of MySpace, Facebook and YouTube, 30 
PA. LAW. 56, 57 (2008) (noting MySpace user who posted “sex, drugs and rock and roll” on list of 
interests) and Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into 
Hiring Decisions, 23 LAB. LAW 19, 36–37 (2007) (discussing employment recruiters discovery of 
potential candidates “risqué ‘photographs and provocative comments about drinking, recreational drug 
use, and sexual exploits' . . .” posted on online social networking sites)). 
 102. See Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 129.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 133.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 133. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 120. 
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from an admissions officer of a prestigious college who had planned 
to admit a young black male from a poor urban community.111 The 
admissions office had been deterred from this decision by the gang 
related content they found on the applicant’s MySpace profile, which 
completely contradicted his admissions essay that had discussed the 
problems with gangs in his community.112 Boyd offered this 
explanation of the apparent contradiction: “Perhaps he needed to 
acquiesce to the norms of the gangs while living in his neighborhood, 
in order to survive and make it through high school to apply to 
college?”113 Boyd explains that the problem highlights how context is 
crucial to properly understanding information.114 When an outsider to 
the social networking community, such as an admissions officer, 
potential employer, or judge, views information on a user’s profile, 
they are unprepared to understand the context.115 Instead, they project 
the context in which they relate to the individual offline onto the 
individual in the online community.116 
In the case of Jessica Binkerd, the judge was presented with 
images of Binkerd drinking with friends.117 Viewed in isolation, these 
pictures only portray one image of the defendant: an irresponsible girl 
who likes to party. However, add to them the fact that Binkerd was a 
recent college graduate who volunteered with autistic children and 
one day hoped to become a psychiatrist,118 and the image of a hard-
partying girl becomes a little harder to imagine. 
Throughout history, public life has not been documented and 
distributed to others to judge, except in the case of celebrities whose 
lives were deemed important enough to share.119 With the advent of 
the Internet and social networking sites, online life has become public 
life. Information is now easily documented and distributed to a wide 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 133. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 133. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 118. Chawkins, Grieving Mother Hopes Motion for Mercy Will Prevail, supra note 1. 
 119. Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites, supra note 98, at 137. 
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range of audiences that can use that information in any number of 
ways.120 In the courtroom, this means a judge may be inundated with 
information that at one time would not have been documented or 
available for consideration. Thus, the question arises whether the 
Supreme Court’s current trend of increasing judicial discretion in 
sentencing determination is the best method for handling the 
increased amount of personal information available for consideration. 
IV.  PREVENTING A DISTORTED VIEW FROM AFFECTING SENTENCING 
A.  Limiting Judicial Sentencing Discretion 
One potential method for preventing online information from 
presenting a distorted view of defendants is to limit its use in 
sentencing determinations. However, a limitation on judicial 
discretion is unlikely to occur given the recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.121 With the Booker decision making the Sentencing 
Guidelines advisory, the Supreme Court has given much sentencing 
discretion back to judges.122 Furthermore, it is well established that a 
sentencing judge is able to consider virtually any information that 
may bear on the determination of the appropriate sentence.123 Adding 
to this wide discretion is the general rule adopted by courts that 
evidence considered by a judge prior to imposing a sentence does not 
need to conform to the same standard as evidence presented at trial in 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. See discussion supra Part I. 
 122. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment, thus the provision of the act 
making the guidelines mandatory is unconstitutional and must be severed); discussion supra Part C 
(discussing judicial sentencing discretion post-Booker). 
 123. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (noting the “well-established” 
discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the ability to consider “any and all information that 
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant”); United States v. Borrero-
Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that sentencing judges have “virtually unfettered 
discretion” and can consider a “largely unlimited variety of information”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3577 
(1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and 
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider 
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). 
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order to comport with due process requirements.124 Combined, the 
Booker decision and the general rules of sentencing effectively mean 
that information taken from online social networking sites is now 
considered under the broad 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) standard of “the 
history and characteristics of the defendant.”125 Thus, sentencing 
judges, who may not understand the nature and context of online 
social networking, are now confronted with information taken out of 
the online context and are using such information to make sentencing 
determinations. 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s move toward 
unfettered judicial sentencing discretion indicates that some members 
of the Court may be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing 
sentencing judges to consider unlimited evidence when making 
sentencing determinations.126 As more judges are confronted with 
information from social networking sites and are faced with the task 
of interpreting this information outside the online context, Justice 
Scalia’s criticism of unfettered sentencing discretion is likely to take 
on a new meaning. However, until the Supreme Court addresses this 
issue and places some limitation on the information sentencing 
judges may consider, these judges are left to weigh and balance this 
information on their own. 
B.  Alternatives to Limiting Judicial Discretion 
Given the broad discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the 
unlikelihood of imposing direct limitations on the use of information 
                                                                                                                 
 124. United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241 (1949)); see also PAUL S. MILICH, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON GEORGIA EVIDENCE 459 
(2009) (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing) (citing FED. R. Evid. 
1101(d)(3)). The Morgan court also notes certain exceptions to this general rule. Morgan, 595 F.2d at 
1136. First, a sentencing judge may not consider unconstitutional prior convictions. Id. (citing United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)). Second, sentencing judges may not consider false information. 
Id. (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)). Third, sentencing determinations “may not rely 
upon the information contained in the presentence report unless it is amplified by information such as to 
be persuasive of the validity of the charge there made.” Id. (citing United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 
626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 125. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2006). 
 126. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 304–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The statute provides no order of priority 
among all those factors . . . the statute—absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1)—authorizes the judge to 
apply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public . . . .”). 
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from social networking sites, other methods to prevent a distorted 
view of defendants should be considered by courts and social 
networking site users themselves. 
1.  Educating Judges as to the Potential for Distortion 
Each state implements its own judicial continuing education 
requirements. Georgia, for example, mandates that each new judge 
attend a new judge orientation course sponsored by the Institute of 
Continuing Judicial Education,127 and every two years judges are 
required to attend at least twenty-four hours of continuing education 
programs.128 Participation in specialized training and education in 
topics outside ethics and professionalism is encouraged but not 
required.129  
Federal judges are not required to attend any continuing education 
programs. However, organizations such as the Foundation for 
Research on Economics and the Environment (FREE) provide 
optional training and educational opportunities for federal judges. 
These organizations offer programs that address current issues facing 
judges. For example, in 2010 FREE offered a program titled: 
Terrorism, Civil Liberty, and National Security: A Program for 
Federal Judges, State Supreme Court Justices, and Law Professors.130 
One possible way to prevent information from social networking 
sites from being misinterpreted and misused in sentencing 
determinations is to provide educational programs to judges that 
address the potential distortion that can occur when such information 
is taken outside of the online context. By educating judges, who 
ultimately have the sole responsibility of weighing information 
presented at the sentencing hearing and determining an appropriate 
sentence,131 about the context of online social networking 
communities, it is less likely that information taken from these sites 
                                                                                                                 
 127. GA. UNIF. STATE CT. R. 43.C (2003). 
 128. Id. at 43.A. 
 129. Id. at 43.D. 
 130. Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, Current Program Offerings, 
http://www.free-eco.org/current_programs.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
 131. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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will automatically be presumed to present a true depiction of the 
defendant. Furthermore, through education, judges will be better 
equipped to properly weigh and balance information from social 
networking sites under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Thus, there 
will be less chance of a distorted view of defendants during the 
sentencing process. 
2.  Warning Social Networking Site Users 
One of the most fascinating aspects of online social networking is 
users’ willingness to post highly personal data, which may not even 
be an accurate representation of the user’s true character offline, onto 
what is essentially a public forum. Studies have indicated several 
possible explanations for this behavior.132 The first possibility is that 
the “foolishness of youth” results in obliviousness to reputational 
risks and inability to foresee the consequences reputational harm may 
have later in life.133 Teens and young adults compose the majority of 
social networking site users, and the tendency of this age group to 
engage in high-risk behavior is well established.134 Thus, it is not 
surprising that despite privacy warnings available on most social 
networking sites, users report retaining an expectation of privacy.135 
The second explanation for users’ willingness to post personal 
information online is that users may not fully understand the 
technology and long-term implications arising from their online 
conduct.136 For example, many users may not comprehend that once 
information is posted it cannot truly be removed or that third parties 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See generally Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001 (2009) (presenting the findings of a study of approximately 2,500 Canadian and 
American college students and online social network users between the ages of 18 and 24). 
 133. Id. at 1017–18 (2009) (citing Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Linking Youth Internet and 
Conventional Problems: Findings from a Clinical Perspective, 15(2) J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT 
& TRAUMA 39 (2007)).  
 134. Id. (citing J. Grunbaum et at., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United States, 2004, 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 21, 2004, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5302a1.htm.).  
 135. Id. at 1004.  
 136. Id. at 1018.  
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may be able to access, alter, or use posted information.137 
Furthermore, only thirty percent of online social network users 
surveyed in one study claim to know that they have the option to 
control privacy features such as the visibility and searchability of 
their profiles.138 
These two factors indicate that social network site users need to be 
educated as to the potential public uses of information they post 
online. Perhaps new regulations requiring social networking sites to 
warn users of these potential uses would help users contemplate the 
consequences of posting information online before they sign on. 
However, because studies indicate that few users actually read the 
privacy warnings that are now available and even fewer users seem to 
comprehend the true meaning of the warnings,139 it is likely up to 
educators and parents to inform youths as to the potential risks of 
online social networking. Right now cases like Jessica Binkerd140 can 
serve as a warning to users and hopefully raise their awareness as to 
the potential downsides of online social networking. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the expanding role social networking sites are playing in the 
lives of millions of people across the world,141 the impact of the 
online world will undoubtedly continue to be felt in many areas of the 
legal system.142 Courts will continue to face issues concerning the 
use, and often times the misuse, of the vast array of information 
available online.143 Sentencing judges will likely confront more and 
more information concerning defendants’ character that was 
undocumented and unavailable for consideration prior to the rise of 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. However, the author notes that “[t]his argument . . . ignores the fact that the majority of 
online socializers grew up online and are perhaps more net-savvy than previous generations.” Id. 
 138. Acquisti & Gross, supra note 70, at 12 (presenting the findings of a study surveying Facebook 
users at a United States academic institution and explaining profile visibility relates to who can read a 
user’s profile, while searchability refers to who can find a user’s profile). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 141. See discussion supra Introduction and Part II. 
 142. See discussion supra Part II.B and III. 
 143. See discussion supra Part III. 
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social networking sites. While this information may have the 
potential to present a distorted view of defendants, the current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence holding the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines advisory144 and the well-established broad range of 
evidence admissible for sentencing determinations145 means that 
limitations on the use of online information are unlikely. Thus, the 
best solution may have to be an effort to educate courts as to the 
potential distortion that can occur when information from social 
networking sites is taken out of the online context.146 As for social 
network users, Jessica Binkerd’s story147 should serve as a warning 
that information they choose to post online could be used against 
them when they least expect it.148  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See discussion supra Part II. 
 145. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984) (noting the “well established” 
discretion allotted to sentencing judges and the ability to consider “any and all information that 
reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant”). 
 146. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 147. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 148. See Evan Wagstaff, Court Case Decision Reveals Dangers of Networking Sites, 87 DAILY 
NEXUS Issue 84 (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.dailynexus.com/2007-02-28/court-case-decision-reveals-
dangers-of-networking-sites/ (“There’s nothing wrong with MySpace, but when you put all these crazy 
pictures on it’s going to come back to bite you. It certainly can be used against you when you least 
expect it.”); Utah DUI Trial Lawyer, http://www.utahduilawblog.com/2008/07/articles/utah-dui-
sentencings/utah-duis-face-book-and-my-space/ (July 18, 2008, 12:33 MDT) (“Take your myspace and 
facebook pages down. If you can’t do that, tone your pages down. Most of all, confessing your sins on 
these pages is just as good as a signed confession to convict you.”). 
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